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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

problem. That opinion relied on several Supreme Court cases2 8 involving application of the cross-section test to state juries, which required
jury commissioners to familiarize themselves with the identity and
availability of potentially qualified jurors in all significant elements of
the community. 9 If jury commissioners did acquaint themselves with
the community, and then combined such acquaintance with readily
available methods of obtaining names of prospective jurors (voter
registration lists, tax rolls, utilities rolls, telephone books and city
directories) , 3 they could establish impartial jury lists which reasonably represent a cross-section of the community. 31 The court should
have adopted the concurring judge's conclusions about the duty of
jury commissioners and thereby met the problem of juror selection
without an unnecessary statutory construction.
VALIDITY OF STATE PROPOSITION EFFECTIVELY
REPEALING ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
The California Legislature did not attempt to prevent property
owners from selecting buyers or tenants on the basis of racial considerations until 1959. Then, by enacting the Hawkins Act' and the Unruh
Furthermore, use of voter lists would discriminate heavily against the Negro
community because Southern voter lists are unlikely to represent a cross-section of
the community until fear of reprisals for registration is eliminated. See ZINN op.
cit. supra note 23, at 138-39; The New Republic, Aug. 13, 1966, pp. 10-11. For state
and federal jury selection provision of 1966 Civil Rights Bill, see Comment, 52 VA. L.
REV. 1069 (1966).
"Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
' One week after Rabihwwitz, the Fifth Circuit accepted the arguments of the
concurring opinion in a state jury selection case. Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1966).
" City directories are ideal for the urban areas of the South which have them.
However, singular use of any one source for juror selection is unsatisfactory.
In 1963 only 69% of the households in Georgia had telephones. The whole Fifth
Circuit had 63.3% while the national average is 81%. STATISTICAL A SaIUCT OF THIE
UNiTE

STATES

38, 517 (1965).

Use of tax rolls would discriminate against the large number of tenants in the
South. In 1959, 24.1% of the farms in Georgia were tenant operated. The Fifth
Circuit average (excluding Florida) is 25% compared with the national average of
19.8%. Id. at 615, 621. Non-farm housing presents a similar problem. In 1960, 38%
of the Southern non-farm housing was rented (whites 33.6%, non-whites 58.4%, Id.
at 761. Unfortunately use of census lists in juror selection is prohibited by 13
U.S.C. § 9(1962).
"In Note, 75 YALE L.J. 322, 329 n.38 (1965), it was contended that the more
sources used in selecting the jury list, the more difficult it is for a judge to supervise the process. See also Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 90 (1963), which questions how
closely Southern district court judges follow appellate decisions.
,§§ 35700-35741. Section 35720 makes it unlawful:
For the owner of any publically assisted housing accommodation which is in,
or to be used for, a multiple dwelling [or a single family dwelling], with knowledge of such assistance, to refuse to sell, rent or lease or otherwise deny to or
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Civil Rights Act,2 the legislature chose to regulate racial discrimination

in all business establishments including those involving the selling or
renting of residential property and in all publicly assisted housing.
Three years later, by enacting the Rumford Fair Housing Act,3 the
legislature extended the regulation of discriminatory conduct to owners
of most, but not all, residential property. As an initiative measure at
the 1964 general election, popularly known as Proposition 14, the
voters of California added to the state constitution article I, section
26. which provides:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit
or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing
or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property as he, in his absolute discretion,
chooses.
Plaintiffs alleged that, contrary to the express provisions of the
Unruh Act, defendants refused to rent available apartment units to
them solely because plaintiffs were Negroes. Defendants' motion for
judgment was made and granted on the ground that Proposition 14
nullified the Unruh Act. On appeal, the California Supreme Court
reversed and held the adoption of Proposition 14 constituted significant state involvement in racial discrimination as prohibited by the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mulkey v.
Reitman, 50 Cal. Rep. 881,413 P.2d 825 (1966).1
withhold from any person or group of persons such housing accommodations
because of the race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry of such person
or persons.
'CAL. Crv. CoDE § 51 provides as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no
matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled
to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or
services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
'CAL. HEALTH & SA. CODE §§ 35700-35744. Section 35700 provides in part:
The practice of discrimination because of race, color, religion, natural origin or
ancestry is declared to be against public policy.
Section 35720 makes it unlawful:
For the owner of any ... [dwelling, other than a dwelling containing not more
than four units], ... to refuse to sell, rent or lease or otherwise to deny to or
withhold from any person or group of persons such housing accommodations
because of the race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry of such person
or persons.
4
Petitiot for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3081 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1966) (No. 483).
In reaching its result, the court relies upon many recent decisions which have
broadened the meaning of "state action." None of these cases are squarely apposite.
Since the issue of state action in this case has been discussed elsewhere, see 2 CAL.
W. L. REv. 109 (1966), this note will consider the theoretical and practical problems
resulting from, and the implications of, the holding in Mulkey.

1966]
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Since the fourteenth amendment is generally construed as limiting
state rather than private action, the equal protection clause does not
prohibit private discrimination if the state is not significantly involved
in or responsible for that discrimination.' Neither does that amendment impose a duty upon the state to prevent such discrimination.'
Nevertheless, the prohibitions of the equal protection clause are not
confined merely to racial discrimination which is directly required or
accomplished by the state itself.' Rather, the fourteenth amendment
is also violated when private discrimination is enforced, 8 authorized,9
encouraged 0 or, under some circumstances, merely tolerated by the
state." In other words, the state will be held responsible for dis'Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961): "private
conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the equal protection clause
unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been
found to have been involved in it."
'Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in which the Supreme Court held that
the fourteenth amendment was intended solely to prohibit public or state denials of
equal protection of the law. The Civil Rights Cases have been cited in later
decisions as standing for a variety of sometimes conflicting propositions. Compare
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), with Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 209 N.Y. 512,
87 N.E. 2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 931 (1950). However the restriction of
the fourteenth amendment to state discrimination has been constantly reaffirmed by
the courts. E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra note 5. See generally Comment, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 473 (1965). Contra, Peters, Civil Rights and State
Non-Actitnt, 34 NoRE DAME LAW. 303 (1959). For possible exceptions to the rule
that the state has no duty to prevent private discrimination, see cases cited in note
11 infra.
' See, e.g., Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) ; Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (racially restrictive covenant could not
constitutionally support suit for damages) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenant invalid) ; Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24 (1948), in which the court stated that in light of Shelley judicial enforcement of these contracts was against "the public policy of the United States." See
Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. Rav. 473
(1962).
'In McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914), the court implies
that the denial of equal railroad facilities to Negroes by a private railroad was
unconstitutional state action because a local statute authorized such discrimination
and, therefore, the carrier perpetrating such discrimination would be acting under
the authority of state law. See also, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 306 (1966)
(White, J., concurring) ; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 726
(Stewart, J., concurring), 727 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (1961). See generally
Henkin, supra note 8; Comment, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 473 (1965).
" In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953), the court, in holding that a
racially restrictive covenant could not constitutionally support a suit for damages,
stated that "the result of that sanction by the State would be to encourage the use of
restrictive covenants. To that extent, the State would act to put its sanction behind
the covenants

.... "

In Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964), the court struck

down racial labeling of candidates because, although the state practice did not require
discrimination on the part of individual voters, it did encourage and assist in such
discrimination.
"In some instances, although the active discrimination is practiced by private
organizations or persons and not perpetrated, required, or participated in by the
state, the state may neverheless be held responsible because of the special character
of the private activity or the state's special relationship to it. In these instances
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crimination perpetrated, at least initially, by private citizens whenever the state, in any meaningful way, lends its processes to the
achievement of that discrimination, even though that goal is not within
the state's purpose.
The Mulkey holding, that the state was significantly involved in the
defendant's discriminatory act of refusing to rent to Negroes, was
primarily based on the court's view that Proposition 14 encouraged
and authorized a form of discrimination which formerly had been
prohibited: "Here the state has affirmatively acted to change its existing laws [the Unruh and Rumford Acts] from a situation wherein the
discriminatory practice was legally restricted to one wherein it is
encouraged.... "1 2 The court reasoned that, although the final act of
discrimination was undertaken by private parties motivated by personal, economic or social considerations, such act was made legally
permissible because Proposition 14 nullified the Unruh and Rumford
Acts. In the court's opinion, just as legislative enactments must be
considered state action, so must the adoption of a law directly by the
people. The implication of Mulkey is that a similar attempt by the
legislature to nullify these acts would also have been prohibited.
Although the Mulkey holding is correct with regard to the validity
of Proposition 14, the holding should not be used to support the establishment of a rule making unconstitutional all attempts to nullify or
repeal existing anti-discrimination laws. Besides not being required by
the fourteenth amendment, such an absolute rule would result in an
unwarranted interference with normal state legislative processes and
seriously restrict a state's ability to find workable solutions to problems
involving racial discrimination.
often involving the performance of traditional governmental or public functions, the
state may not refuse to proscribe discriminatory conduct. E.g., Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296 (1966) (operation of municipal park) ; Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225
(1956) (private organization operating pursuant to scheme of statutory regulation) ;
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (conducting elections) ; Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946) (corporation governing town). In Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, supra, the Court implicitly held that a state has a duty to prevent
discrimination by its private lessee. State inaction in good faith subsequent to the
grant of the lease was no excuse for the state's failure to fulfill its duty to control.
Any contrary implications of the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), were to that
extent overruled. Burton thus reveals that state inaction provides a basis for applying the fourteenth amendment where previous state action (as the grant of the lease)
establishes state responsibility for private discrimination.
That the Constitution may favor, in some instances, basic property rights and
rights of personal liberty above the right to equality and freedom from discrimination, even above the right not to have the state lend its support to inequality, see
Henkin, supra note 8.
50 Cal. Rep. 881, 890, 413 P.2d 825, 834 (1966).
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Generally, there can be no vested right in an existing law which
precludes its change. 3 It is clear that it is the function of the legislature to change rules of law, 14 that each subsequent legislature has
equal power to legislate upon the same subject, and that one legislature cannot abridge the power of a succeeding legislature.' Furthermore, state constitutions, including that of California, 7 typically reserve to the people the power to adopt or repeal laws and constitutional
amendments.', A second safeguard against the legislature acting contrary to voters' wishes is the power to elect new representatives who
will make desired changes.' 9 These safeguards, however, are rendered
meaningless at least with regard to civil rights legislation, if the
Mulkey holding is interpreted to preclude both the electorate and the
legislature from repealing or nullifying any anti-discrimination law
once it is enacted.
Indeed, such an interpretation could be extended to the defeat of a
proposed civil rights law by the state legislature itself. Such action
does not necessarily represent public approval of private discrimination; rather, it may indicate only dissatisfaction with some aspects of
the bill. But whether or not defeat does in fact reflect public approval
of private discrimination, the legislature would, in effect, be declaring
" Arizona Employers' Liab. Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919); Cf. Middleton v. Texas

Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152 (1919).
" United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940) (suspension of military
reenlistment allowances); Role v. J. Neils Lumber Co., 74 F. Supp. 812 (D. Mont.
1947), aff'd, 171 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1949) (repeal of Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938).
' Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899); State ex rel.
Anderson v. Brand, 214 Ind. 347, 5 N.E.2d 531 (1937).
" Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932) ; Seymour v. United States, 77 F.2d
577 (8th Cir. 1935); Preveslin v. Derby & Anosnia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129,
151 Atl. 518 (1930).
"CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 1, provides:
The legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly
which shall be designated "The Legislature of the State of California," but the
people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to the
Constitution, and to adopt or reject the same, at the polls independent of the
Legislature, and also reserve the power, at their own option, to so adopt or
reject any act, or section or part of any act, passed by the Legislature.
M'"ARTIN

&

GEORGE, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND CITIzENsHIP

297 (1927) :

The deepest cut into legislative competence has been made by direct government
.... The rise and spread of the ideas embodied in the initiative, referendum,
and recall may be traced to the same spirit of distrust and discontent which
promoted constitutional restrictions on state legislatures .... Legislators were
not responsive to public opinion, nor responsive to the will of their masters.
"Id. at 49:
As one means of achieving political responsibility, revolutionary political
theory made much of the sovereignty of the people .... Unable to make laws and
execute them directly, the people were obliged to have recourse to representatives; but they made it abundantly clear that their representatives were only
their agents, and as such were to be kept responsive to public opinion by
frequent elections and short terms of office.
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that the state will not prohibit or impose sanctions on certain discriminatory conduct and, to that extent would be offering encouragement to the particular form of discrimination. Taking the Mulkey
reasoning to its logical extreme might produce the absurd result that a
state legislator could "force" his legislature into a denial of equal pro2
tection through the mere introduction of civil rights legislation. 1
Mulkey also leaves uncertain the extent to which the California
electorate or legislature may experiment in the civil rights area. Placing significant restrictions on a state's ability to modify or repeal laws
affecting racial discrimination may well remove much of the flexibility
necessary in any attempt to solve complex social problems. Under the
Mulkey climate, legislatures would certainly hesitate before enacting
new anti-discrimination laws for fear that the courts would void any
future attempt to repeal such laws even though they proved unworkable or unwise.
It is submitted that the test of whether or not repeal or modification
of a particular anti-discrimination law is constitutionally permissible is
whether such action results in a reversal of established state policy
proscribing such discrimination, or whether it constitutes an integral
part of the state's initial decision whether to establish that policy.
As a rule, a state is free to choose between establishing or not establishing a general policy proscribing a particular form of discrimination,
subject only to rather broad constitutional limitations.2 While the
initial decision to refrain from establishing such a policy may have the
effect of encouraging discrimination, nevertheless such encouragement
hardly appears sufficient "to justify a kind of circular logic whereby
inaction creates a positive duty on the state where none existed pre22
viously.)
Once a state, however, affirmatively establishes a policy proscribing
some form of discrimination, then the subsequent reversal of that
policy may indeed controvert the fourteenth amendment. The effectuation of such a reversal goes well beyond mere state inaction which
incidentally encourages discrimination and may even be construed as
See generally Comment, 50 CORNELL L. Q. 473 (1965) ; Comment, 52 Nw. U. L.
REv. 774 (1958). Although the Mulkey court places great reliance on the fact that
Proposition 14 nullified existing laws, it could be argued that when the governor
vetoes a particular anti-discrimination bill, he affirmatively promotes discriminatory
conduct which otherwise would have been prevented. In this sense, the state, acting
through the executive, would be encouraging discrimination. This line of reasoning,
however, leads to the conclusion that the governor must function as nothing more
than a rubber-stamp for the legislature whenever civil rights legislation is involved.
-1 See note 11 supra.
- See Comment, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 473, 498 (1965).
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affirmatively expressing a state policy fostering discrimination. 8 A
state cannot meaningfully claim to be merely returning to its original
position of neutrality with regard to a particular form of discrimination, for the very act of retreating to a neutral position involves, in
effect, state authorization of that discrimination. Whereas the rejected
policy may have imposed specific sanctions on those practicing discrimination, and may have induced reliance on state protection against
such discrimination, by a return to neutrality that same discrimination would be permitted and that protection withdrawn.2 4
Clearly, both a governor's veto and a legislature's defeat of a proposed anti-discrimination bill would constitute integral parts of a
state's choice not to establish a policy against discrimination, and not
a reversal of some existing policy proscribing such discrimination.
Thus, such action should not constitute a denial of equal protection of
the laws within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, even though
some ancillary encouragement of discrimination may thereby result.
It is submitted that the electorate's direct and immediate rejection,
by popular vote, of an anti-discrimination law recently enacted by the
legislature could also be considered part of the state's initial choice
not to establish a policy against discrimination. Such action by the
electorate would not result in the reversal of some long-standing state
policy, but would parallel the governor's exercise of his veto power over
'In Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962), a Tennessee statute renounced the state's common law cause of action for exclusion from hotels and other
public places and declared that operators of such establishments were free to exclude
persons for any reason whatever. The court held that the statute could not stand
consistently with the fourteenth amendment even though the statute was relevant only
insofar as it expressed affirmatively the state policy of fostering segregation. As in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the private discrimination in Turner was practiced in a public facility leased from the state;
nevertheless, the court did not seem to limit the application of its holding to the
Burton situation.
" Many states have statutes which in effect permit discrimination at the option
of the individual. The statutes are typically anti-trespass in form. Other than
Turner v. City of Memphis, supra note 23, there is little authority that such legislation violates the equal protection clause. Where the opportunity to discuss equal
protection has been available, the Court typically turns its decision on other grounds.
In two cases, City of Charleston v. Mitchell, 239 S.C. 376, 123 S.E.2d 512 (1961),
rev'd per curiant 378 U.S. 551 (1964), and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964), the Court held that the state court, in retroactively applying a new construction of the statute involved, deprived the defendants of their right to fair
warning of criminal prohibitions and thereby violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964), the court reversed a trespass conviction because the one evicting and arresting the defendant was
a deputy sheriff. The thrust of Griffin is that anti-trespass statutes are invalid when
used by the state to enforce private discrimination. In Robinson v. Florida, 378
U.S. 153 (1964), the court reversed defendant's conviction under a trespass statute
because of a state Health Board regulation requiring segregation and not because of
the statute. That these holdings are not to be narrowly construed was made clear by
Mr. Justice Black in his majority opinion in Robinson and in his dissent in Bell v.
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the legislature.' Moreover, if the state's initial decision to establish a
policy against some form of discrimination may, unlike most governmental decisions, thereafter be irrevocably binding on the state, then
the electorate should have some opportunity to reject, either directly
or through their future representatives, an initial decision made by one
session of the legislature acting contrary to the electorate's will.2 0

The repeal or modification of a particular anti-discrimination law,
however, should not automatically be rendered unconstitutional merely
because such action is not part of the state's initial policy decision.
Repeal may be justified when it constitutes change in the particular
method of effectuating the state's policy against discrimination without
27
actually nullifying the policy itself.
When the approach suggested above is applied to the facts in Mulkey, it appears that the court reached the right result. California made
its initial decision to establish a policy actively condemning racial discrimination in housing when the legislature enacted the Unruh and
Hawkins Acts in 1959. By those acts, the legislature imposed sanctions
on the practice of discrimination in publically assisted housing and in
all business establishments including those selling or renting residential
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). The justice asserts that private discrimination
generally violates the fourteenth amendment once the state in any way discourages
integration or instigates or encourages segregation.
'Once a bill is passed by the legislature, the governor may reject the bill by
exercising his veto power, or he may allow the bill to become law by either approving it or by failing to return it to the legislature with his objections within the
required time. Likewise, when a law is enacted by the legislature, the electorate
normally may immediately reject the law by adopting an initiative or they may
accept the law either by defeating an initiative which sought to repeal the law or
by simply taking no action at all. Furthermore, both the electorate's initiative and
the governor's veto are often used to check hasty, ill-considered legislation; but just
as the legislature may override the governor's veto, so may the legislature reenact a
law repealed by the electorate.
It could be argued, however, that electorate action necessarily reverses established
state policy whereas the governor's action does not, because the electorate's initiative
repeals an existing law while the governor's veto operates only on proposed law.
' See text accompanying notes 13 to 19 supra.
Assume that pursuant to the mandate of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), or a state constitutional provision, e.g., WAsH. CONsT. art. IX, § 1, a state
has an established policy proscribing racial discrimination in education. As one
method of effectuating the policy, the state legislature abolishes the "neighborhood"
school system and adopts a city-wide transfer program which results in racial
balance within every school in each metropolitan area. Subsequently, the legislature
determines that the transfer program was creating serious problems within some or
all of the school districts and was, in fact, not promoting racial harmony. The legislature further determines that the real cause of de facto segregation is discriminatory practices in housing and employment which forces certain minority groups to
cluster in one neighborhood of each school district. On the basis of these determinations, the legislature readopts the "neighborhood" school system, makes the transfer
program optional to each school district, and commences or increases its attack on
discrimination in housing and employment. Here, the state has not reversed its
general policy against discrimination in education; rather, it has changed merely
the method of effectuating that policy.
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property. During the next four years, neither the legislature nor the
electorate made any serious attempt to reverse or nullify this policy.
Then, by enacting the Rumford Act in 1963, the legislature adopted as
a third method of executing this policy the imposition of sanctions
directly on the individual property owner. It was mainly in reaction to
this latter method that the electorate adopted Proposition 14-five
years after the legislature's initial decision to attack discrimination in
housing. It is therefore submitted that the electorate's action in 1964
was far too removed from the legislature's initial choice in 1959 to be
construed as part of some initial state choice not to establish a general
policy proscribing such discrimination.
Furthermore, the adoption of Proposition 14 constituted far more
than merely the electorate's rejection of a particular method of executing that policy, i.e., imposing sanctions on private property owners.
The terms of Proposition 14 were so broad as to virtually preclude
state use of any meaningful method of proscribing discrimination in
housing; and because Proposition 14 was constitutional rather than
legislative, only the people and not the legislature would have had the
power to change or modify its terms. Moreover, constitutional provisions are typically more difficult to change than legislative enactments; as a result Proposition 14 could well have continued long after
a majority of the electorate would be willing to accept the sanctions of
the Unruh and Rumford Acts. Since Proposition 14 affirmatively
established the property owner's right to refuse to sell or rent his
property for any reason whatever, including racial prejudice, the measure would seem to validate the enforcement of that right. But Supreme Court cases involving judicial enforcement of private discrimination cast doubt on the enforceability of such a right if the property
owner was, in fact, motivated by racial considerations.2"
' See cases cited in note 8 supra. See also Henkin, supra note 8. In Abstract
Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rep. 309 (1962,) an eviction
proceeding, the court applied the reasoning of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
and held as reversible error the exclusion of evidence showing that plaintiff-landlord's action was motivated by racial considerations, even though the Negro tenant
was admittedly in default. The court believed that if, in fact, the plaintiff's action
was motivated by racial prejudice, then judicial enforcement of the plaintiff's
otherwise legal property right would effectuate plaintiff's discrimination and therefore violate the equal protection clause. Contrary to Hutchinson, Proposition 14
would seem to call for the enforcement of the plaintiff's actions, regardless of his
racial motivations.
In striking down Proposition 14, the majority opinion in Mulkey emphasizes
the fact that existing law was modified. This is perhaps misleading; the question
remains whether Proposition 14 would have been upheld in the absence of prior
legislation. That it would have been upheld is unlikely for the reasons stated in the
paragraph preceding note 28.
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Unanswered is the question whether the electorate or the legislature
could constitutionally simply repeal the sanctions on private property
owners imposed by the Rumford Act. Such action would appear to
be directed only at changing a particular method of executing the
state's policy against discrimination in housing, rather than at reversing the policy itself. Moreover, since the legislature could at any
time reenact those sanctions or enact new laws relating to the discriminatory conduct of private property owners, the repeal of the
Rumford Act would not result in the serious restrictions on the state's
ability to deal with this problem which resulted from the adoption of
Proposition 14. Nevertheless, even the mere legislative repeal of those
sanctions against private property owners might be invalidated if the
court believed that the lack of such sanctions thereby nullified the
state's entire policy against discrimination in housing.

'PUBLIC PURPOSE" IN MUNICIPAL
FINANCING PLANS
The City Commission of Deerfield Beach authorized issuance of
municipal bonds pledged by certain excise taxes to purchase land on
which a major league baseball training facility was to be built and
maintained by the city. The facility was to be leased to and operated
by a private corporation. Rental, payable to the city, was to be the
annual debt service on the bonds plus fifty per cent of net profits in
excess of prior years' losses. Validation of the proposed issuance was
decreed by the circuit court. On a taxpayer's appeal, the Florida
Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, reversed. Held: A bond
issuance proposed by a municipality, whereby the municipality agreed
to purchase land on which to build and maintain a baseball training
facility for subsequent lease to a private corporation, violates state
constitutional provisions prohibiting assessment of taxes1 and extension of credit2 for purposes which are not "public." 3 Brandes v. City
1

FLA. CONST. art. 9, § 5 provides:

The Legislature shall authorize the several counties and incorporated cities or
towns in the State to assess and impose taxes for county and municipal purposes,
and for no other purposes, and all property shall be taxed upon the principles
established for State taxation.
2
FLA. CoNsT. art. 9, § 10 provides:
The Legislature shall not authorize any county, city, borough, township or
incorporated district to become a stockholder in any company, association or
corporation, or to obtain or appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to, any
corporation, association, institution or individual.
8
Numerous state constitutions prohibit taxation except for public purposes. See

